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I    INTRODUCTION 
This article presents statistical information about the High Court’s decision-
making for 2013 at both an institutional and individual level, with an emphasis 
on constitutional cases as a subset of the total. The results have been compiled 
using the same methodology1 employed in studies of earlier years.2 Likewise, we 
maintain our customary advice to readers about the inevitable limitations that 
must apply to the results of an empirical study of the decisions of any final court 
over the space of a single calendar year. In particular, the fact that constitutional 
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cases comprise just a portion of the High Court’s annual work means that we 
strive to make observations leaning more towards circumspection than boldness. 
Nevertheless, taking stock of the cases handed down by the Court in the 
preceding year and the way in which the justices have, as individuals within the 
institution, decided their outcomes is illuminating. As ever, we are careful not to 
attribute greater or lesser ‘influence’ to particular individuals simply through 
tracking the rates of consensus, dissent and co-authorship experienced within the 
Court.  
In last year’s survey, we highlighted the significance of the departures of 
Gummow and Heydon JJ after 17 and 10 years respectively on the High Court 
bench. Justice Heydon delivered just three more opinions in early 2013 before 
following Gummow J into retirement. As a result, last year was the first full year 
of service for Gageler J, and Keane J joined the Court in March. Although the 
latter necessarily sat on fewer cases in 2013 than his new colleagues, he handed 
down opinions in enough cases for us to say that he is still well represented in the 
survey, though of course a caveat applies throughout that his results are not fully 
comparable to those of the other judges.  
What does the Court now look like with its new composition? Has the 
institutional picture been dramatically or even discernibly altered by the 
exchange of two of its members? Asking these questions enables us to test the 
strength of the observations drawn and reflections offered in earlier studies about 
the part played on the Court by certain individuals and their impact upon the way 
in which, as a multi-member institution, it reaches its decisions. In particular, 
there have been two markedly consistent features of the Court’s decision-making 
throughout this series of surveys (the results of which stretch back to 1998). 
Those features have been: (1) a pronounced rate of joining in opinion between a 
pair of judges amongst the ranks of the majority (Gummow and Hayne JJ); and 
(2) the presence of one member (having been first Kirby J and then Heydon J) 
with an especially high rate of minority opinions relative to his colleagues. In 
light of the personnel changes, will these steady features of the Court’s 
institutional dynamic fade or even disappear entirely? Or will they continue as 
the present incumbents develop their own work practices and their role within the 
institution. 
It has been implicit throughout this series that who the individual judges are 
and who they sit alongside matters in our attempts to fully appreciate the High 
Court as a public institution that decides controversies by majority vote after 
deliberation. This essential truth was confirmed in a remarkable speech made 
overseas by Justice Dyson Heydon in 2012, but only published on the eve of his 
retirement, in which he warned of the institutional harm able to be caused by 
‘excessively dominant judicial personalities’3 in conjunction with ‘judicial herd 
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behaviour’.4 Justice Heydon revealed a strong distaste for the use by some judges 
of judicial conferences as an occasion on which to forge consensus over 
disagreement, branding it ‘polite or jovial invitations … to tell lies’.5 In our 
survey of the Court’s decisions in 2012, we discussed Justice Heydon’s views in 
explaining his notable record of writing alone throughout his final year on the 
Court.6 But their utility clearly transcends his specific situation even if, as Sir 
Anthony Mason has remarked, the risks he identified are ‘not … as great as he 
suggests’.7 Mason went on to confirm, less as a warning and more as a statement 
of the inevitable, that: 
The way in which a court works depends in large measure on the personalities of, 
and the relationship between, its members. The dynamics of that relationship vary 
considerably and can change dramatically in an enclosed community like the High 
Court ... However inconvenient it may be, every Justice has a responsibility to 
endeavour to establish a working relationship with colleagues.8 
Both of these recent contributions highlight the intersection of institutional 
and individual factors in how the High Court fulfils its role. These modest annual 
studies aim to shed some light on these aspects through compiling information 
about the way the Court’s members resolve the legal disputes that come before 
them. This enables empirical observation rather than anecdotal evidence or mere 
impression to feature in our understanding of how the High Court shapes the law 
of Australia. 
 
II    THE INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE 
Table A – High Court of Australia Matters Tallied for 2013 
 Unanimous By Concurrence Majority over Dissent TOTAL 
All Matters Tallied for 
Period 
21 
(38.18%) 
20 
(36.36%) 
14 
(25.45%) 
55 
(100%) 
All Constitutional Matters 
Tallied for Period 
1 
(8.33%) 
7 
(58.33%) 
4 
(33.33%) 
12 
(100%) 
 
A total of 55 matters were tallied for 2013.9 An additional five matters (all 
identified in the Appendix) appear on the AustLII High Court database for the 
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year but these were excluded consistently with the methodology that has been 
employed throughout these annual studies. Four of the five were discounted 
simply because they were decided by a single justice or, in one case, two justices. 
The fifth exclusion does, however, warrant some direct comment since it is of a 
substantial decision and also one that would have been included in tallying for 
the subset of constitutional cases. That matter is Monis v The Queen.10 This case 
is excluded due to being a 3:3 decision ultimately resolved by the procedural rule 
that an appeal to the Court fails if the bench is evenly divided as to whether it 
should be allowed or dismissed.11 In that case, French CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ 
would have allowed the appeal while Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ favoured 
dismissal. This very scenario – and the consequence of exclusion – is addressed 
in rule (b) of the methodology applied in compiling these statistics.12 As one of us 
said in explaining the relevant approach, while ‘judgments may still be compared 
against the final orders issued by the institution, the complete lack of a relational 
dimension between the justices themselves in the determination of those orders 
argues against tallying as dissents those opinions which are at odds with the 
result of the case’.13 None of this is to deny that Monis v The Queen is an 
interesting and important 2013 decision on the constitutionally implied freedom 
of political communication, but for present purposes it is set aside. 
As it is, the 55 matters which are tallied for the purposes of this study places 
2013 as the second-busiest year experienced by the High Court since the 
appointment of French CJ. In 2012, 61 matters were tallied but in the years 
preceding that the totals were 48 (consecutively in 2011 and 2010) and 52 (in 
2009) cases. In its first two years, the French Court achieved extremely high rates 
of unanimity in its resolution of the matters before it, ones which, we submitted, 
were simply unprecedented in the modern era. But the Court’s newly-found 
capacity to reach consensus soon evaporated with the rate of unanimity 
plummeting from a high of 50 per cent in 2010 to 17 per cent and 13 per cent in 
2011 and 2012 respectively. At least one significant factor in that trend was, as 
already noted in the Introduction, the resolve of Heydon J to join with no other 
member in the giving of reasons in his final year on the Court. This meant that 
unanimity was not an option whenever he sat on a case during this period, 
leaving only a handful of cases in which a single judgment might emerge as the 
expression of agreement between the other members of the Court. There may be 
other elements in play, but certainly it is not surprising that the departure of 
Heydon J has resulted in an upswing in the number of unanimous opinions 
written by the Court. At just over 38 per cent the rate of unanimity is not quite on 
par with the early years of the French era, but when we take the longer view, this 
is still a substantial percentage of cases in any single year and signals that the 
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11  Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 23(2)(a).  
12  Lynch, ‘Dissent’, above n 1, 484. 
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current members of the Court are, as a group, more willing to grasp opportunities 
for unanimity than has been so in both the recent and not so recent past. 
The ability of the Court in 2013 to convert agreement amongst sitting justices 
into unanimous opinions has produced a decline in the number of matters 
resolved through two or more concurring judgments and absent any dissent. In 
2012, just over 54 per cent of matters were decided through concurrences. Justice 
Heydon’s resistance to joint authorship did not, of course, necessarily reflect his 
disagreement from the result reached by his colleagues. Consequently, the Court, 
while frequently thwarted in speaking unanimously, still decided many cases 
with separate concurring opinions. The greater opportunity to speak with one 
voice in 2013 has seen a corresponding decline in the proportion of cases 
resolved by separate concurrences.  
In about 1 in 4 cases, the Court’s decision was accompanied by dissent. In 
2012, the percentage of such cases was 32.79 per cent, which itself was a notable 
decrease from exactly half the cases of 2011 being ones containing a minority 
opinion. The French Court’s return to higher levels of unanimity has not, then, 
been simply a matter of converting cases decided through concurrence into those 
where a single set of reasons is given. There has also been a decline in explicit 
disagreement over the same period.  
In 2013, the High Court returned to an institutional decision-making profile 
which was essentially similar to that of the first two years of the French Court. 
Those years had started to appear as aberrant, but the 2013 results suggest that 
they might yet stand as representing a more typical pattern going forward than 
the dramatically different results seen in 2011–12. Certainly, the absence, for the 
time being, of a clearly identifiable ‘outlier’ judge on the bench14 – something 
further revealed in the individual tables in Part III – would seem an important 
factor in maintaining the Court’s return last year to a high rate of unanimity and a 
reduction in the number of split decisions.  
In 2013, the Court confronted constitutional questions in 12 out of the 55 
matters tallied – or 21.82 per cent. This was a minor decline from the result of 
24.59 per cent in 2012, which was in any event a higher figure than had been 
seen for some years.15 As we explained in discussing the apparent surge in 
matters touching upon constitutional issues in 2012,16 our classification, while 
erring on the side of generous inclusion rather than selection according to some 
more substantial, but also subjective, criterion, has been consistently applied over 
the course of these studies. So, as ever, in some of the 12 matters tallied as 
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Supreme Court of Canada’ (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 99, 112.  
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The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92 for reasons already given. 
16  Lynch and Williams (2013), above n 2, 516. 
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‘constitutional’ for 2013, this aspect of the case may be marginal or restricted to 
discussion by just some members of the Court.17  
The definitional criteria that determines our classification of matters as 
‘constitutional’ remains that which was provided by Stephen Gageler SC, now 
Gageler J of the High Court, when he gave the inaugural annual survey of the 
High Court’s constitutional decisions in 2002. He viewed ‘constitutional’ matters 
as:  
that subset of cases decided by the High Court in the application of legal principle 
identified by the Court as being derived from the Australian Constitution 
(‘Constitution’). That definition is framed deliberately to take in a wider category 
of cases than those simply involving matters falling within the constitutional 
description of ‘a matter arising under this Constitution or involving its 
interpretation’.18 
Our only amendment to this statement as a classificatory tool has been to 
additionally include any matters before the Court involving questions of purely 
state or territory constitutional law.19 In 2013, there were, however, no such 
cases. 
A striking feature of the institutional results for 2012 was the Court deciding 
only about a quarter of constitutional cases over one or more dissenting opinions. 
That was a clear break from the almost invariable pattern in earlier years of about 
half the constitutional matters splitting the Court. In 2013, the percentage of 
cases in which there was a minority rose to a third, but this is still notably low. 
For the last two years the members of the Court have agreed with each other 
more often than not in cases where a constitutional issue is present. This was not 
the case in earlier years where disagreement was just as common as consensus, if 
not more so. 
The set of constitutional cases comprises matters variously decided by seven, 
six, five and three judges sitting together. The only unanimous matter tallied is 
Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (‘Same-Sex Marriage Case’).20  
 
  
                                                
17  A good example is the case of X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92, in which one of 
the questions reserved involved an issue under Chapter III of the Constitution. Only two judges directly 
addressed that issue with the rest finding that it did not arise. 
18  Stephen Gageler, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2001 Term’ (2002) 25 University of New 
South Wales Law Journal 194, 195. 
19  Lynch and Williams (2008), above n 2, 240. 
20  (2013) 304 ALR 204. 
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TABLE B(I) All Matters – Breakdown of Matters by Resolution and Number of Opinions Delivered21 
Size of 
Bench 
Number of 
Matters 
How Resolved Frequency Cases Sorted by Number of 
Opinions Delivered 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 
13 
(23.64%) 
Unanimous 4 (7.27%) 4       
By concurrence 5 (9.09%)  4     1 
6:1 2 (3.64%)  1 1     
5:2 -        
4:3 2 (3.64%)    1  1  
 
6 
10 
(18.18%) 
Unanimous 2 (3.64%) 2       
By concurrence 6 (10.91%)  3 1 1  1  
5:1 1 (1.82%)     1   
4:2 1 (1.82%)   1     
 
5 
30 
(54.55%) 
Unanimous 13 (23.64%) 13       
By concurrence 9 (16.36%)  5 4     
4:1 6 (10.91%)  1 3 2    
3:2 2 (3.64%)  1 1     
 
3 
2 
(3.28%) 
Unanimous 2 (3.64%) 2       
By concurrence -        
2:1 -        
 
  
                                                
21  All percentages given in this table are of the total number of matters (55). 
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TABLE B(II) Constitutional Matters – Breakdown of Matters by Resolution and Number of Opinions 
Delivered22 
Size of 
Bench 
Number of 
Matters 
How Resolved Frequency Cases Sorted by Number of 
Opinions Delivered 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 3 
(25.00%) 
Unanimous -        
By concurrence 1 (8.33%)  1      
6:1 1 (8.33%)   1     
5:2 -        
4:3 1 (8.33%)    1    
 
6 7 
(58.33%) 
Unanimous 1 (8.33%) 1       
By concurrence 5 (41.66%)  2 1 1  1  
5:1 1 (8.33%)     1   
4:2 -        
 
5 2 
(16.66%) 
Unanimous -        
By concurrence 1 (8.33%)   1     
4:1 -        
3:2 1 (8.33%)   1     
 
Tables B(I) and (II) reveal several things about the High Court’s decision-
making over 2013. First, they present a breakdown of, respectively, all matters 
and then just constitutional matters according to the size of the bench and how 
frequently it split in the various possible ways open to it. Second, the tables 
record the number of opinions which were produced by the Court in making 
these decisions. This is indicated by the column headed ‘Cases Sorted by 
Number of Opinions Delivered’. Immediately under that heading are the figures 
1 to 7, which are the number of opinions which it is possible for the Court to 
deliver. Where that full range is not applicable, shading is used to block off the 
irrelevant categories. It is important to stress that the figures given in the fields of 
the ‘Number of Opinions Delivered’ column refer to the number of cases 
containing as many individual opinions as indicated in the heading bar. 
                                                
22  All percentages given in this table are of the total number of constitutional matters (12). 
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These tables should be read from left to right. For example, Table B(I) tells 
us that of the 13 matters heard by a seven-member bench, five were decided 
through concurring judgments but in four of those there were just two opinions 
while in the fifth all seven justices wrote separately. But when one looks at the 
case in question, SZOQQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 23  the 
appearance of disunity turns out to be a mirage. In SZOQQ the lead opinion was 
authored by Keane J, attracting bare statements of concurrence from the 
remaining six justices. We have previously explained that, despite the fact of 
unqualified consensus, cases decided in this way are still tallied as having been 
decided through concurrences, since the form in which the agreement across the 
Court is expressed is not joint but separate. In fact, the only time the Court 
decides a case in this fashion is in the first sitting year of a new judge, whose 
substantive opinion is agreed to by the set of concurrences.24  
The only other case in 2013 in which there were as many opinions as there 
were justices was Maloney v The Queen,25 an unsuccessful challenge to State 
liquor controls on Palm Island as inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The case was decided without dissent, but all six 
judges on the bench wrote separately.  
Table B(I) enables us to identify the most common features of the cases in 
the period under examination. In 2013 these were the delivery of a unanimous 
judgment by a five-member bench. This was also the most frequent form of 
decision in 2009 and 2010, when unanimity was at record levels. In every other 
year since we began presenting these particular tables, the most common pattern 
has been of a 5:0 decision resolved through two concurring opinions.  
Table B(II) records the same information in respect of the subset of 
constitutional cases. Given its subject matter, Maloney also features in this table 
as the only constitutional case in which all judges wrote individually. The most 
common format of constitutional case in 2013 was a six-judge decision made 
without dissent and through just two sets of reasons. The constitutional matter in 
which the bench was most tightly divided was X7 v Australian Crime 
Commission 26  (a 3:2 result), but as already noted that is a case in which 
constitutional questions were far from decisive.  
 
                                                
23  (2013) 296 ALR 409 (‘SZOQQ’). 
24  We have noted this practice in respect of each new justice since the arrival of Heydon J: Lynch and 
Williams (2008), above n 2, 243; Lynch and Williams (2010), above n 2, 274; Lynch and Williams 
(2013), above n 2, 519. 
25  (2013) 298 ALR 308 (‘Maloney’). 
26  (2013) 248 CLR 92. 
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TABLE C – Subject Matter of Constitutional Cases 
Topic No of Cases References to Cases 
(Italics indicate repetition) 
s 7 2 3, 58 
s 24 2 3, 58 
s 51(ii) 1 34 
s 51(xxi) 1 55 
s 51(xxii) 1 55 
s 64 1 58 
Chapter III Judicial Power 5 5, 7, 29, 40, 53 
s 75(v) 1 18 
s 76 1 26 
s 77 1 26 
s 91 1 34 
s 99 1 34 
s 109 1 28 
s 128 2 3, 58 
Melbourne Corporation principle 1 34 
Implied Freedom of Political Communication 2 3, 58 
 
Table C lists the provisions and aspects of the Constitution that arose for 
consideration in the 12 constitutional law matters tallied for 2013. It is assembled 
primarily through reference to constitutional provisions in the catchwords 
accompanying each decision.  
Once again, we note the exclusion of Monis throughout this data set – it was 
a third High Court case from last year, which raised the implied freedom of 
political communication, alongside the two tallied in Table C – which are 
Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide27 and Unions NSW v 
New South Wales.28 
 
                                                
27  (2013) 249 CLR 1. 
28  (2013) 304 ALR 266. 
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III   THE INDIVIDUAL PROFILE 
TABLE D(I) – Actions of Individual Justices: All Matters 
 Number of 
Judgments 
Participation in 
Unanimous Judgment 
Concurrences Dissents 
French CJ 48 17 (35.42%) 30 (62.50%) 1 (2.08%) 
Hayne J 40 10 (25.00%) 26 (65.00%) 4 (10.00%) 
Heydon J 3 0 (0%) 2 (66.67%) 1 (33.33%) 
Crennan J 47 16 (34.04%) 30 (63.83%) 1 (2.13%) 
Kiefel J 49 20 (40.82%) 27 (55.10%) 2 (4.08%) 
Bell J 46 17 (36.96%) 25 (54.35%) 4 (8.70%) 
Gageler J 43 15 (34.88%) 22 (51.16%) 6 (13.95%) 
Keane J 31 16 (51.61%) 13 (41.94%) 2 (6.45%) 
 
Table D(I) presents, in respect of each justice, the delivery of unanimous, 
concurring and dissenting opinions in 2013. Justice Heydon, who sat on only 
three of the matters tallied, is included in this and all subsequent tables in this 
Part for the sake of completeness. It is not suggested any comparative analysis 
between him and the other members of the Court last year is possible. Justice 
Heydon was succeeded by Keane J, whose overall caseload is, given his slightly 
delayed start to the Court’s sitting year, rather lower than those of his colleagues. 
A gap of between 9 and 18 decided cases lies between Keane J and his new 
colleagues at the Court. Consequently, it is difficult to engage in direct 
comparison in respect of the way Keane J and the other justices decided the cases 
of 2013.  
As a sign that things have changed on the Court, 2013 is one of the few years 
since we began these annual studies in which there is no obvious ‘outlier’ justice 
– an individual whose opinions were routinely in the minority. Justice Gageler 
dissented most often at 13.95 per cent but this is trifling when compared to the 
rate of disagreement of Heydon J and Kirby J in earlier years (both of whom 
nudged 50 per cent in, respectively, 2011 and 2006). The dissent rate of Heydon 
J, it must be noted, only soared towards the end of his time on the Court and had 
previously either been close to the very low rates which typified the High Court 
under Gleeson CJ or risen occasionally to around 15 per cent.  
Just two extra dissents separate Gageler J from both Hayne and Bell JJ and 
every member of the Court filed at least one minority opinion. Only Hayne, 
Heydon, Bell and Gageler JJ had the experience of being in lone dissent, and of 
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the three who served the full year, only Gageler J was in the minority by himself 
more often than with at least one other justice. 
Chief Justice French and Crennan J co-authored their only dissent in X7 v 
Australian Crime Commission.29 Only two other dissenting opinions were co-
authored: by Kiefel and Keane JJ in Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for 
Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship30 and Bell and Gageler JJ in 
Hunt & Hunt Lawyers v Mitchell Morgan Nominees Pty Ltd.31  
The rates of participation in unanimous judgments are, once again, highly 
varied across the table, reflecting the differently comprised courts that heard a 
range of matters. So, Hayne J found himself a party to a unanimous opinion in 
only a quarter of the cases on which he sat, while Keane J exceeded the former’s 
number of unanimous opinions and achieved a unanimity rate of 50 per cent of 
the cases he heard. Of course, the distinctive nature of the matters in question and 
how benches of just five justices are comprised are inescapable variables. The 
results cannot by themselves reveal much more than the opportunities for 
unanimity available across the year for each judge. Unless they are especially 
marked or accompanied by a clear public statement like that offered by Heydon J 
in 2012, different results in respect of unanimity cannot reliably inform us about 
the willingness or otherwise of any individual judge to join with his or her 
colleagues.  
 
TABLE D(II) – Actions of Individual Justices: Constitutional Matters 
 Number of 
Judgments 
Participation in 
Unanimous Judgment 
Concurrences Dissents 
French CJ 12 1 (8.33%) 10 (83.33%) 1 (8.33%) 
Hayne J 12 1 (8.33%) 10 (83.33%) 1 (8.33%) 
Heydon J 1 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
Crennan J 11 1 (9.09%) 9 (81.82%) 1 (9.09%) 
Kiefel J 12 1 (8.33%) 10 (83.33%) 1 (8.33%) 
Bell J 12 1 (8.33%) 11 (91.66%) 0 (0%) 
Gageler J 7 0 (0%) 6 (85.71%) 1 (14.29%) 
Keane J 6 1 (16.66%) 4 (66.66%) 1 (16.66%) 
 
Table D(II) records the actions of individual justices in the constitutional 
cases of 2013. It should be noted that Gageler J, as well as newcomer Keane J, 
sat on a fewer number of these cases.  
                                                
29  (2013) 248 CLR 92. 
30  (2013) 304 ALR 135. 
31  (2013) 247 CLR 613. 
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Only Bell J recorded no dissent in a constitutional matter. But that said, it is 
worth illuminating the nature of the cases in which minority opinions are tallied 
for the remainder of the Court, since this puts the significance of the 
disagreement into clearer perspective. Only the dissents of Heydon and Gageler 
JJ can be said to have been delivered in cases in which the constitutional issues 
were central to the resolution of the matter. Those opinions were given in, 
respectively, Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide32 and 
Magaming v The Queen.33  
By contrast, the joint dissent of French CJ and Crennan J in X7 v Australian 
Crime Commission34 and by Hayne, Kiefel and Keane JJ in Plaintiff M76/2013 v 
Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship35 were in cases 
where the constitutional issue was, respectively, peripheral36 or substantial, but 
ultimately not determinative.37 In particular, the dissents tallied in the latter case 
arise from the affirmation which those justices give of the correctness of the 
Court’s decision in Al-Kateb v Godwin,38 a matter that the other four members of 
the Court deemed unnecessary to determine in light of the facts before them. That 
division is a significant one – but not, it must be said, one that affected the 
plaintiff since all seven members of the Court agreed that her detention was 
presently authorised under relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).  
The single unanimous constitutional matter was, as noted above, the 
successful challenge to the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT) in the 
Same-Sex Marriage Case.39 
Tables E(I) and E(II) indicate the number of times a justice jointly authored 
an opinion with his or her colleagues. It should be borne in mind that the judges 
do not hear the same number of cases in a year. For this reason, the tables should 
be read horizontally as the percentage results vary depending on the number of 
cases on which each member of the Court actually sat. That justices do not 
necessarily sit with each other on an equal number of occasions should also be 
noted as a factor that limits opportunities for some pairings to collaborate more 
often. This particularly applies to Keane J given the significantly fewer cases he 
heard in 2013. Justice Heydon sat on just three of the matters tallied for the year 
and, consistent with his decisions in 2012, he did not join with any other justice 
on those occasions. 
 
                                                
32  (2013) 249 CLR 1. 
33  (2013) 302 ALR 461. 
34  (2013) 248 CLR 92. 
35  (2013) 304 ALR 135. 
36  X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92. 
37  Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 304 ALR 
135. 
38  (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
39  (2013) 304 ALR 204. 
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TABLE E(I) – Joint Judgment Authorship: All Matters 
 French CJ Hayne J Heydon J Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J Gageler J Keane J 
French CJ - 20 
(41.66%) 
0 
(0%) 
29  
(60.42%) 
29  
(60.42%) 
24 
(50.00%) 
14 
(29.17%) 
19 
(39.58%) 
Hayne J 20 
(50.00%) 
- 0 
(0%) 
23 
(57.50%) 
28 
(70.00%) 
23 
(57.50%) 
6 
(15.00%) 
13 
(32.50%) 
Heydon J 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
- 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
- 
Crennan J 29 
(61.70%) 
23 
(48.94%) 
0 
(0%) 
- 34 
(72.34%) 
30 
(63.83%) 
15 
(31.91%) 
19 
(40.43%) 
Kiefel J 29 
(59.18%) 
28 
(57.14%) 
0 
(0%) 
34 
(69.39%) 
- 29 
(59.18%) 
15 
(30.61%) 
20 
(40.82%) 
Bell J 24 
(52.17%) 
23 
(50.00%) 
0 
(0%) 
30 
(65.22%) 
29 
(63.04%) 
- 15 
(32.61%) 
20 
(43.48%) 
Gageler J  14 
(32.56%) 
6 
(13.95%) 
0 
(0%) 
15 
(34.88%) 
15 
(34.88%) 
15 
(34.88%) 
- 15 
(34.88%) 
Keane J 19  
(61.29%) 
13 
(41.94%) 
- 19 
(61.29%) 
20 
(64.52%) 
20 
(64.52%) 
15 
(48.39%) 
- 
 
TABLE E(II) – Joint Judgment Authorship: Constitutional Matters 
 French CJ Hayne J Heydon J Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J Gageler J Keane J 
French CJ - 4 
(33.33%) 
0 
(0%) 
5 
(41.66%) 
4 
(33.33%) 
4 
(33.33%) 
1 
(8.33%) 
2 
(16.66%) 
Hayne J 4 
(33.33%) 
- 0 
(0%) 
6 
(50.00%) 
7 
(58.33%) 
9 
(75.00%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(25.00%) 
Heydon J 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
- 0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
- 
Crennan J 5 
(45.45%) 
6 
(54.55%) 
0 
(0%) 
- 7 
(63.64%) 
7 
(63.64%) 
1 
(9.09%) 
2 
(18.18%) 
Kiefel J 4 
(33.33%) 
7 
(58.33%) 
0 
(0%) 
7 
(58.33%) 
- 7 
(58.33%) 
0 
(0%) 
3 
(25.00%) 
Bell J 4 
(33.33%) 
9 
(75.00%) 
0 
(0%) 
7 
(58.33%) 
7 
(58.33%) 
- 1 
(8.33%) 
3 
(25.00%) 
Gageler J  1 
(14.29%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(14.29%) 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(14.29%) 
- 0 
(0%) 
Keane J 2 
(33.33%) 
3 
(50.00%) 
- 2 
(33.33%) 
3 
(50.00%) 
3 
(50.00%) 
0 
(0%) 
- 
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In a Court with a strong rate of unanimous opinions, it is not surprising to see 
fairly high levels of joining across the bench in Table E(I). Consequently, it 
should be acknowledged that the gap between how frequently one judge wrote 
with various colleagues is often minimal, just one or two decisions, so the 
ranking of different judges as co-authors for any particular member of the Court 
(made clearer in Tables F(I) and (II)) should not be over-emphasised. Justice 
Kiefel decided more cases than anyone else last year and so she was well-placed 
to be the most frequent co-author of opinions for every other member of the 
Court. This was indeed the case, except for Bell J who wrote with Crennan J on 
just one extra occasion. Justices Crennan, Kiefel and Bell were all more regular 
co-authors for each other and the other members of the Court than anyone else. 
This is not solely a result of the fact that they heard more cases than the others – 
French CJ decided just one less case than Kiefel J and his rate of joining with 
colleagues was not as consistently high. The most regular co-authoring 
relationship was that between Crennan and Kiefel JJ which reached the same 
level – around 70 per cent of the opinions authored by each – attained by 
Gummow and Hayne JJ in earlier studies in this series. However, while Crennan 
and Kiefel JJ have written together frequently while on the Court together, each 
has written just as if not more often with other members of the Court in previous 
years. There is no reason to suspect they will continue to be each other’s most 
frequent co-author in 2014 and beyond. But their rate of joining with each other 
last year is notable – even if it does not endure. 
The other interesting feature in Table E(I) is the contrast presented by the 
Court’s two newest justices. Just as a matter of raw numbers, and despite his 
significantly lower number of decided cases, Keane J showed himself to be a 
more regular co-author with colleagues than Gageler J, who sat on the Court for 
the full year. The contrast of the percentages is particularly striking. Justice 
Gageler wrote with others on no more than approximately a third of cases on 
which he sat (and significantly less often with Hayne J than the rest of the 
bench). Justice Keane, on the other hand, decided over 60 per cent of the cases he 
heard by writing with French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ. Only time will tell 
whether those early signs of propensity to write separately or jointly continue, or 
whether they are simply reflective of the issues in the particular cases of 2013 
and the composition of the benches which decided them. However, Justice 
Gageler’s high rate of individual authorship may be more than coincidental. In 
the Sir Frank Kitto Lecture he delivered at the University of New England on 11 
November 2013, Gageler J gave a strong indication that, like Dyson Heydon 
before him, he is alert to the importance of maintaining the individual ‘decisional 
independence necessary to ensure the quality of collective decision-making’.40 
Justice Gageler acknowledged ‘the constant risk of deliberation to the quality of 
group decision-making is the risk of loss of independence of individual 
                                                
40  See Stephen Gageler, ‘Why Write Judgments?’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 189, 199.  
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judgments within the group’.41 However, he stated that this ‘risk is one to be 
managed’ 42  – it does not, contrary to Heydon’s insistence, necessitate the 
unwavering delivery of sole-authored opinions. For as Gageler J conceded, ‘[i]f, 
having reasoned independently to the same conclusion, they [judges] are able to 
put immaterial differences aside and agree on a common form of expression of 
those reasons, then the systemic benefits can be expected to outweigh the costs of 
doing so.’43  
Table E(II) reveals joint judgments in constitutional matters. In this context 
the picture changes slightly – Hayne J emerges as a more frequent co-author with 
his colleagues than he was generally. Indeed, he and Bell J, in a continuation of 
their form from the preceding year, wrote together in 75 per cent of cases with a 
constitutional flavour. This was more often than any other judges wrote with 
each other. At the same time, Hayne J was tied with others as the most regular 
co-author in constitutional cases for both Kiefel and Keane JJ. He was the second 
most regular co-author (separated from the top spot by just one judgment) for 
both French CJ and Crennan J.  
Overall, Bell J was the judge with whom all colleagues wrote most often in 
constitutional cases, though for each of them she was often tied as most regular 
co-author with other members of the Court. Only the Chief Justice joined with 
someone else more frequently – and that was Crennan J in just one more case.  
Justice Gageler’s low rate of joining in Table E(I) translates to the results in 
respect of constitutional cases. He did not write at all with Hayne, Kiefel or 
Keane JJ and just once with French CJ44 and then, on another occasion, with 
Crennan and Bell JJ.45 Although it must be noted that Gageler J sat on fewer 
constitutional matters than other members of the Court, Keane J sat on one less 
yet still joined with others more. 
For the sake of clarity, the rankings of co-authorship indicated by Tables E(I) 
and (II) are the subject of the tables below. 
 
  
                                                
41  Ibid 197. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Ibid 201. 
44  TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 295 ALR 
596. 
45  Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship (2013) 304 ALR 
135. 
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TABLE F(I) – Joint Judgment Authorship: All Matters: Rankings 
 French 
CJ 
Hayne J Heydon 
J 
Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J Gageler 
J 
Keane J 
French CJ - 3 N/A 1 1 2 5 4 
Hayne J  3 - N/A 2 1 2 5 4 
Heydon J N/A N/A - N/A N/A N/A N/A - 
Crennan J  3 4 N/A - 1 2 6 5 
Kiefel J 2 3 N/A 1 - 2 5 4 
Bell J 3 4 N/A 1 2 - 6 5 
Gageler J 2 3 N/A 1 1 1 - 1 
Keane J 2 4 - 2 1 1 3 - 
 
TABLE F(II) – Joint Judgment Authorship: Constitutional Matters: Rankings 
 French 
CJ 
Hayne J Heydon 
J 
Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J Gageler 
J 
Keane J 
French CJ - 2 N/A 1 2 2 4 3 
Hayne J  4 - N/A 3 2 1 N/A 5 
Heydon J N/A N/A - N/A N/A N/A N/A - 
Crennan J  3 2 N/A - 1 1 5 4 
Kiefel J 2 1 N/A 1 - 1 N/A 3 
Bell J 3 1 N/A 2 2 - 5 4 
Gageler J 1 N/A N/A 1 N/A 1 - N/A 
Keane J 2 1 - 2 1 1 N/A - 
 
IV    CONCLUSION 
At the outset, we asked what picture might now be drawn of the High Court 
given its new composition. Has the pattern of decision-making on the Court been 
dramatically or even discernibly altered by the exchange of two of its members? 
The answer is clearly that recent departures and appointments have made a 
difference. However, this has not resulted in the Court embarking on a major new 
direction, but seen it return to the patterns established in the first years of the 
French Court. 
Those initial two years of the Court under French CJ (2009 and 2010) saw an 
unusually high level of agreement and unanimity amongst members of the bench. 
This clarity of consenus broke down in 2011 and 2012, due especially to the 
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idiosyncratic approach of Heydon J, who ended his career on the Court rivalling 
the most prominent dissenters in the institution’s history. Justice Heydon adopted 
an unqualified insistence upon expressing his views on a case through a sole-
authored opinion, irrespective of the approach of other members of the Court. His 
unwillingness even to settle with others as to how their mutual agreement on the 
outcome of a case might be jointly articulated, made unanimity impossible. 
The retirement of Heydon J removed the sole source of persistent dissent 
from the Court. The highest rate of dissent in 2013 across all matters was by 
Gageler J, who dissented in 13.95 per cent of matters, but this bears no 
comparison to the highest rates of dissent reached by both Heydon and Kirby JJ. 
Significant differences certainly remain between members of the current Court, 
both as to their views on the law and their judicial method, but in 2013 this did 
not frequently manifest as differences over the result ordered in the matters 
decided. Hence, last year saw a high level of unanimity, along with a low rate of 
dissent by all members of the Court across decisions as a whole, and 
constitutional law cases in particular. 
Other aspects of the Court’s decision-making remain in a state of 
development. In particular, unlike the prior, pronounced rate of joining in opinion 
writing by Gummow and Hayne JJ, the current Court in 2013 saw a high level of 
agreement across the board, without the emergence of any notable associations 
between judges. The most regular co-authoring relationship was that between 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ in regard to all matters, and Hayne and Bell JJ in regard to 
constitutional matters. Even if these collaborations represent important 
alignments within the Court, they will not have the opportunity to develop over a 
significant period of time. This is because both Hayne and Crennan JJ must retire 
from the Court at age 70 in 2015. 
It is too early to discern any noticeable trends when it comes to the decision-
making of the High Court’s two newest justices, Gageler and Keane JJ. What can 
be said about their judgments in 2013 is that there was a contrast between them, 
with Gageler J showing a greater preference for writing alone, sometimes in 
dissent, as opposed to Justice Keane’s willingness to join with the judgments of 
his colleagues. It is not yet possible to see whether this represents a longer term 
approach on either of their parts. How judges initially begin their time on the 
High Court is often not indicative of the reputation they will build over the years 
ahead. There is a legion of examples of members of the Court – some from the 
very recent past, others from much earlier – changing their decision-making style 
over the course of their tenure on the Court. Sometimes this occurs dramatically, 
sometimes very gradually over a number of years. Sometimes it is accompanied 
by extra-curial proclamation or reflection, while in other instances it occurs 
subtly in response to some change in the institution’s membership.46 The purpose 
of regular annual studies such as this is to monitor the dynamics of the Court and 
                                                
46  Consider the example offered by Sir Anthony Mason of the replacement of Menzies J with Murphy J: 
Mason, above n 7, 112. 
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identify the emergence of new patterns in the interaction of its seven members as 
they go about their common institutional endeavour. 
 
APPENDIX – EXPLANATORY NOTES 
The notes identify when and how discretion has been exercised in compiling 
the statistical tables in this article. As the Harvard Law Review editors once 
stated in explaining their own methodology, ‘the nature of the errors likely to be 
committed in constructing the tables should be indicated so that the reader might 
assess for himself the accuracy and value of the information conveyed’.47 
 
A    Matters Identified as Constitutional 
• Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] 
HCA 3. 
• TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Judges of the Federal Court 
of Australia [2013] HCA 5. 
• Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 7.  
• Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18.  
• New South Wales v Kable [2013] HCA 26.   
• Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28.  
• X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29.  
• Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Commonwealth [2013] HCA 34. 
• Magaming v The Queen [2013] HCA 40.  
• Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and 
Citizenship [2013] HCA 53. 
• Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory [2013] HCA 55.  
• Unions NSW v New South Wales [2013] HCA 58.  
 
B    Matters Not Tallied 
• Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4 – a six-member bench resulting in a 
3:3 split, resolved by application of section 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act 
1903 (Cth). 
• Michaelides v The Queen [2013] HCA 9 – French CJ and Crennan J 
sitting. 
• Gajjar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] HCA 13 – 
Kiefel J sitting alone. 
                                                
47  Louis Henkin, ‘The Supreme Court, 1967 Term’ (1968) 82 Harvard Law Review 63, 301–2. 
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• Plaintiff S3/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] 
HCA 22 – Gageler J sitting alone. 
• Rutledge v Victoria [2013] HCA 60 – Hayne J sitting alone. 
 
C    Cases Involving a Number of Matters – How Tallied 
The following cases involved a number of matters but were tallied singly due 
to the presence of a common factual basis or questions: 
• Huynh v The Queen [2013] HCA 6. 
• Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty 
Ltd; Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Allam [2013] HCA 21.  
• Elias v The Queen; Issa v The Queen [2013] HCA 31.  
• Apotex Pty Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis Australia Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 50. 
No case was tallied as a multiple number of matters in this study.48  
 
D    Tallying Decisions Warranting Explanation 
• Weinstock v Beck [2013] HCA 14 and Beck v Weinstock [2013] HCA 15 
– the parties are the same but reversed as appellant and respondent in the 
two matters and although the factual background is the same, the issues 
in each matter are different and the cases are reported – and thus tallied – 
separately. 
• X7 v Australian Crime Commission [2013] HCA 29 – although the 
catchwords do not refer to any constitutional issue, one of the questions 
reserved by the parties involved a Chapter III issue which was directly 
addressed by two members of the Court (French CJ and Crennan J), the 
other judges finding that the issue did not arise. This case was thus 
classified as ‘constitutional’. 
• Kline v Official Secretary to the Governor-General [2013] HCA 52 – the 
catchwords do not list any constitutional matter but the judgments given 
by the Court offer some brief observations about the nature of the 
Governor-General’s office and his/her powers under section 61. This 
case was not classified as ‘constitutional’. 
• Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and 
Citizenship [2013] HCA 53 – although the catchwords do not refer to any 
constitutional issues, one of the questions reserved by the parties 
involved a Chapter III issue, namely the validity of provisions 
authorising detention as determined by the Court’s earlier decision in Al-
Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. This question was directly 
addressed by several judges, and indeed was a point of division. Justices 
                                                
48  The purpose behind multiple tallying in some cases – and the competing arguments – are considered in 
Lynch, ‘Dissent’, above n 1, 500–02.  
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Hayne, Kiefel and Keane are tallied as dissenting due to differences 
between their orders and those of the other judges, particularly as regards 
the constitutional validity of section 198 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
This case was thus classified as ‘constitutional’. 
 
 
